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Abstract  
Since the late 1970s, the received wisdom has been that government size (measured as the ratio of 
total government expenditure to GDP or government consumption to GDP) is detrimental to 
economic growth. We conduct a hierarchical meta-regression analysis of 799 effect-size estimates 
reported in 87 primary studies to verify if such assertion is supported by existing evidence. Our 
findings indicate that the conventional prior belief is supported by evidence mainly from developed 
countries but not from less developed countries (LDCs). We argue that the negative relationship 
between government size and economic growth in developed countries may reflect endogeneity 
bias. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most contentious issues in economics is whether ‘big government’ is good or bad for 
economic growth. In recent decades, the received wisdom has been that big government is 
detrimental to growth. This consensus has been tested by the onset of the recent financial crisis in 
Europe and the United States (US). Governments have been called upon to act not only as lenders 
of last resort but also as demand-managing and bank-nationalising fiscal heavyweights, the 
spending capacity of which was considered as a crucial ingredient for recovery. Nevertheless, the 
financial crisis has also demonstrated the persistence of the received wisdom. A large number of 
European countries including fiscally-comfortable countries such as Germany and the UK had 
adopted austerity programs with the aim of spurring growth by creating more room for private 
investment.  
The continued appeal of the received wisdom may be due to ambiguity in economic theory, which 
suggests that government size may have both positive and negative effects on growth.  Government 
can play a growth-enhancing role by providing public goods, minimising externalities and 
maintaining confidence in a reliable medium of exchange. Government can also contribute to 
growth by enhancing human capital through investments in health and education and by building 
and maintaining a sound infrastructure (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Ram, 1986; De Witte and 
Moesen, 2010). From a Keynesian perspective, increased government spending increases 
aggregate demand that in turn increases output. 
On the other hand, big government may affect growth adversely because of crowding-out effects 
on private investment (Landau, 1983; Engen and Skinner, 1992). Big government also implies 
high taxes, most of which are distortionary and hence growth-reducing (De Gregorio, 1992). 
Increased government size can also be a source of inefficiency due to rent seeking and political 
corruption that harm economic growth (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Mauro, 1995; Hamilton, 
2013). 
There are also some reasons to expect an inverted-U relationship between government size and 
economic growth (e.g., Barro, 1990; Armey, 1995). According to Barro (1990), when the ratio of 
government spending to output is low, the positive effect of government spending on the marginal 
product of capital tends to dominate the negative effect of taxes on the private return to capital. 
Thus, a rise in the ratio of government spending to output tends to increase economic growth. 
However, the opposite tends to occur when the ratio of government spending to output is high. 
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Similarly, Armey (1995) also posits an inverted-U relationship between government size and 
growth by invoking the law of diminishing factor returns. When government is sufficiently small, 
an increase in government size may be associated with higher growth rates as the government 
ensures rule of law and property right protection. However, when the government size is beyond 
the optimal level, a further increase in government size is associated with lower growth rates. Since 
government size in developed countries is typically larger than that in less developed countries, 
the ‘Armey curve’ suggests that the relationship between government size and economic growth 
tends to be negative in developed countries.      
Beyond the theoretical literature, a large empirical literature has explored the relationship between 
government size and economic growth but the empirical evidence on the relationship is 
inconclusive. On the one hand, a large number of studies report a negative relationship between 
government size and growth (see, e.g., Grier and Tullock, 1989; Barro, 1991; Ghura, 1995; Lee, 
1995; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001; among others). On the other hand, a sizeable number report a 
positive relationship (see, e.g., Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990; Evans and Karras, 1994).  
Heterogeneous findings are to be expected because government size is measured differently,1 
countries may be at different stages of development and the optimal government size may differ 
between countries, depending on prevailing political/institutional structures (Bergh and Karlsson, 
2010). In addition, model specification as well as estimation methods differ between studies. 
Finally, earlier studies on determinants of growth report that the effect of government size on 
growth is either not robust to model specification (Levine and Renelt, 1992) or does not remain a 
significant determinant of growth in a series of Bayesian averaging trials (Sala-i-Martin et al., 
2004).2   
Given this landscape, there is evident need to verify where the balance of the evidence lies. The 
synthesis should address not only the question of whether government size is growth-enhancing 
or growth-retarding, but also the extent of publication selection bias and sources of heterogeneity 
in the evidence base.  
                                                          
1 Government consumption is measured as all government expenditure for goods and services but excluding military 
expenditure, and in some cases education expenditure (see, e.g., Barro, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). According 
to the OECD, total government expenditure, on the other hand, captures the total amount of expenditure by 
government that needs to be financed via government revenues.  
2 Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) report that government consumption has a negative effect on growth (-0.034). 
Surprisingly, however, the adverse effect of government consumption is less severe than that of public investment (-
0.062).  
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A number of past reviews have already tried to synthesize the existing findings (e.g., Poot, 2000; 
Nijkamp and Poot, 2004; and Bergh and Henrekson, 2011). Some studies focus on the growth-
effects of specific types of government expenditure and taxation but others (e.g. Bergh and 
Henrekson, 2011) focus on government size in general. These reviews provide useful narrative 
syntheses that reflect the state of the art in the research field but they fall short of allowing for 
robust inference about the ‘effect size’, the extent of selection bias and the sources of heterogeneity 
in the evidence base. One reason is sample selection bias which arises when reviewers rely on a 
subset of the effect-size estimates reported in primary studies. Secondly, even when the full set of 
effect-size estimates is utilized (e.g., Nijkamp and Poot, 2004), they do not have systematic tests 
for publication selection bias, which occurs when primary study authors and/or journal editors tend 
to report findings that reject a null hypothesis. Last but not least, discussions on the sources of 
heterogeneity in the existing reviews are largely descriptive as it relies mainly on “vote counting” 
or narrative summary.3  
Hence, we aim to contribute to existing knowledge along four dimensions. First, we provide a 
quantitative synthesis of the evidence on the growth effects of government size (measured by the 
ratio of total government expenditure to GDP and the ratio of government consumption to GDP) 
by taking into account information provided in 87 empirical studies that report 799 effect-size 
estimates. Secondly, we address the issue of selection bias that arises when primary study authors 
search for samples, estimation methods or model specifications that yield statistically significant 
estimates; or when narrative reviews rely on ‘representative’ or ‘preferred’ estimates rather than 
all available information. Third, we address the issue of data dependence that arises when primary 
studies that draw on a particular dataset report multiple estimates or when different studies utilize 
overlapping segments of the existing country datasets. Finally, we account for sources of 
heterogeneity in the evidence base, including estimation methods, data periods, data types (cross-
section versus panel data), publication types and the level of development.  
With regards to heterogeneity, two of our findings are key. The first suggests that the effect of 
government size on per-capita GDP growth is negative in developed countries but insignificant in 
LDCs. This is the case irrespective of whether government size is measured as the share of total 
expenditure or consumption expenditure in GDP. In the full sample that consists of evidence on 
                                                          
3 Vote counting is a method of synthesizing evidence from multiple studies, which involves the comparisons of studies 
reporting the direction of effect. For instance, number of positive effects or negative effects. This approach does not 
take into account study specific characteristics such as the size of samples used, quality of methods or effect size.  
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both developed and LDCs, the effect is insignificant when government size is measured as the 
ratio of total expenditure to GDP but is negative and smaller in magnitude when government size 
is measured as the share of government consumption in GDP. We argue that the negative 
relationship between government size and economic growth is more likely to hold in developed 
countries as opposed to LDCs. We also argue that the negative relationship observed in developed 
countries should be interpreted with caution for three reasons: (i) increasing government share in 
GDP and declining economic growth had been concurrent trends in developed countries since the 
mid-1970s; (ii) the negative effect in developed countries may be reflecting other structural factors 
that drive both lower growth rates and larger government sizes in these countries; (iii) in contrast 
to linear specifications in the literature, the relationship between government size and growth may 
be non-linear. Secondly, we find evidence that primary-studies that control for endogeneity 
through instrumental variable (IV) methods (e.g., 2SLS, 3SLS, etc.) report systematically less 
adverse effects when government size is measured as the share consumption in GDP.  
2. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations 
Several perspectives exist on what explains growth. According to the seminal work by Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956), an economy grows over time due to exogenous technological progress. 
Although neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) have a successful track record 
in estimating capital and labour elasticities (i.e., capital and labour shares in output) at the macro, 
industry and firm levels, these models have some shortcomings. The main shortcoming comes 
from the assumption that the source of long-run growth (i.e., technology) is exogenous and so the 
resulting total factor productivity can be captured only through the residuals of the estimated 
model. Another important issue is that the original model has to be augmented with a measure of 
government size even though the latter is not theorised to have any effect on long-run growth.  
Endogenous growth models address the latter issue by endogenizing the factors that determine 
long-run growth (e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 1990; Romer, 1990; 
Rebelo, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Romer (1986) leads the way to allow investment in 
knowledge to affect growth, while Lucas (1988) provides the first human capital approach to 
endogenize growth. Other endogenous growth models such as Romer (1990) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) endogenize technological progress. In Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990), public 
investment enhances long-run growth. More recent work has focused on other determinants of 
growth such as geography, institutions and culture (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002; Tabellini, 2010; 
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Dell et al., 2012). Overall, in endogenous growth models, sustained long-run growth arises from 
endogenous sources and cross-country differences in per-capita income can persist indefinitely. In 
these models, government policy can alter the level of endogenous variables such as human capital 
or investment rates and may have theory-driven implications for the country’s long-run growth.  
Hence, one factor that is likely to cause heterogeneity in the empirical evidence is the theoretical 
model utilized in the empirical studies. Some studies (e.g., Bajo-Rubio, 2000; Bodman et al., 2012) 
augment the neoclassical Solow-type growth model with government size (𝐺), which yields a 
generic model of the type below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝜆𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝛾𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡          (1) 
In (1), 𝑌 is income (usually measured as gross domestic product – GDP), which is a function of 
technology (𝐴), capital stock (𝐾) and labour force (𝐿). Subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 represent country and 
time, respectively. Augmenting (1) with government size (𝐺) has been proposed by Feder (1983) 
and Ram (1986).  
In the standard model, technology is exogenous and treated as an unobservable country-specific 
fixed factor. However, technology can be decomposed into a country-specific fixed component 
(?̃?𝑖𝑒
𝜆𝑡) and a component that depends on a country’s observed characteristics (𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜃). Hence, we let 
 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝜆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖𝑒
𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜃 where ?̃? captures technology shocks unobservable to the researchers and 𝐶 
is a proxy for observable technological change due to country characteristics.  
Dividing the output and the inputs by labour (𝐿) and taking natural logarithms, we obtain: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜂𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (1a – levels equation) 
Here y is output per employee (or per-capita GDP as a proxy), k is capital per employee (or per-
capita capital as a proxy) and g is the measure of government size (measured as the ratio of total 
government expenditure or government consumption to GDP). The coefficients on capital per 
employee (𝛼) is the elasticity of output with respect to capital; whereas the coefficient on labour 
(𝛿) is a measure of returns to scale, that is 𝛿 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 − 1.4  The log of unobservable technical 
change ( ln (?̃?𝑖𝑒
𝜆𝑡)) yields a country-specific effect (𝜂𝑖) and a time effect (𝜆𝑡). An observable 
                                                          
4 In (1a), constant returns to scale are not imposed. Hence, the coefficient on labour lnL indicates increasing, decreasing 
or constant returns to scale – depending on whether 𝛿 is greater than, smaller than or equal to zero. 
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technological effect (𝜃) depends on determinants of technological change at the country level 
which may include geography, culture, political and economic institutions. The error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a 
white-noise disturbance term with zero mean and a constant variance.   
 
The country-specific fixed effect (𝜂𝑖) can be eliminated by first-differencing (1a).  
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆 + 𝜃∆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼∆𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿∆𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡             (1b – first-differenced equation) 
where ∆ is log difference between periods t and t-1. In most studies, the ratio of government 
expenditure or consumption to GDP (𝑔𝑖𝑡) is used instead of its growth rate (∆𝑔𝑖𝑡) (see, Rubinson, 
1977; Landau, 1983). Hence, the estimated growth model usually takes the form: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆 + 𝜃∆𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼∆𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿∆𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1c – empirical model in most studies) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term.
5 The coefficient of interest is 𝛾, which is: (i) either the 
elasticity of per-capita GDP with respect to government size if primary studies use the logarithm 
of g; or (ii) a semi-elasticity of per-capita GDP with respect to government size if primary studies 
use g as a ratio only.  
A considerable number of studies also adopt a variant of the endogenous growth model. These 
studies follow Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), where the determinants of growth include 
investment in physical capital (𝑘) and human capital (ℎ), augmented with other covariates such as 
government size (𝑔) and other variables found to be related to growth in the empirical literature 
(e.g., initial level of per-capita GDP, openness, financial development, etc.). Endogenous growth 
models usually take the following form: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑍𝑗,𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (2 – endogenous growth model) 
Here, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of per-capita GDP and 𝑔 is the ratio of total government expenditure 
to GDP or government consumption to GDP; and 𝑍 is a vector of variables commonly used in the 
economic growth literature, including financial deepening or institutional quality, etc. This 
                                                          
5 Model (1c) has been used by a large number of primary studies included in this review, including Grossman (1990), 
Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) and Dar and AmirKhalkhali (2002), among others. 
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specification has been widely used in the empirical growth literature, including Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), Stroup and Heckelman (2001) and Bose et al. (2007).  
There are also hybrid models - including simultaneous equation models where government size is 
modelled to have both direct and indirect effects on growth; and Keynesian models where 
government size affects growth from both the demand and supply side (see, e.g., Tanninen, 1999; 
Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008).  
To ensure comparability, we include studies and extract effect-size estimates for our meta-analysis 
if: (a) a study uses one of the three growth models summarized above; (b) the independent 
(intervention) variable in the model is measured as the ratio of total government expenditure to 
GDP or government consumption to GDP or their logarithms; and (c) the dependent (outcome) 
variable is measured as the growth rate of per-capita GDP.6  
Given that the dependent variable is log-difference, the effect-size estimates (𝛾) can be either 
elasticities if the independent variable is in logs or semi-elasticities if it is a ratio. Therefore, the 
effect-size estimates are not comparable. To ensure comparability and allow pooling, we calculate 
partial correlation coefficients (PCCs) for each effect-size estimate, in accordance with the formula 
given in the Appendix.  
The use of the aforementioned models to estimate the growth impact of government size may pose 
some estimation issues. For instance, there are reasons for expecting problems of endogeneity in 
the existing literature. The potential for omitted variables and reverse causality implied by 
Wagner’s (1877) Law and the ratchet effect of Bird (1971, 1972), among others, lead us to suspect 
issues of endogeneity (Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Bellante & Porter, 1998; De Witte & Moesen, 
2010). Wagner’s Law suggests that government size increases as countries become richer, while 
the ratchet effect suggests that government size increases significantly during periods of crisis and 
then grows to the new and higher level after the crisis.  
Most studies use instrumental variable techniques (e.g., 2SLS and 3SLS) to properly identify the 
causal effect between government size and growth (e.g., Fölster & Henrekson, 2001; Afonso & 
Furceri, 2010). The unavailability of good instruments for government size has also led some 
                                                          
6 We also conduct a sensitivity check to establish whether the exclusion of non-eligible studies based on our selection 
criteria affects the meta-regression results. The sensitivity check indicates that the results reported in our study are 
robust. The results of the sensitivity check are not presented here but are available from the authors upon request.  
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studies to employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to deal with endogeneity (e.g., 
Romero-Avila & Strauch, 2008). Our meta-analysis controls for these differences in estimation 
methods together with other observed heterogeneity in the literature using multivariate meta-
regressions.  
The sources of heterogeneity include model choice (exogenous/neoclassical, endogenous, hybrid 
models), data type (panel and cross-section data), time period over which panel-data is averaged 
and whether there is control for business cycles. To account for the effects of these sources of 
heterogeneity, we code each estimate with respect to the growth model it is derived from, data type 
and the number of years over which the panel data is averaged.  
Other sources of heterogeneity we control for include: (i) whether primary studies control for 
endogeneity through instrumental variable or dynamic panel-data techniques; (ii) whether control 
variables such as initial GDP, investment, population (growth or size), government tax revenues, 
etc. are included in estimated models; (iii) publication type (e.g., journal articles, working papers 
and book chapters); (iv) publication date; (v) journal quality ranking; (vi) country type (developed 
versus less developed); (vii) length of periods over which data is averaged in cross-section and 
panel-data studies; and (viii) the data period. 
3. An overview of the evidence base 
Our meta-analysis methodology draws on best practice for meta-analysis of research findings in 
economics and business research (Stanley et al., 2013). We searched five electronic databases - 
JSTOR, EconLit, Business Source Complete, Google Scholar and ProQuest - for journal articles, 
working papers and book chapters; using various keywords for government size and growth.7 We 
also conduct a manual search which involves examining the references of key reviews and seminal 
studies that examine the relationship between government size and economic growth. We have 
used consistent criteria to include primary studies and effect-size estimates, as indicated above. 
The inclusion criteria have led to exclusion of primary studies that use other measures of 
government size such as expenditure or consumption levels or the growth rate of government 
expenditure/consumption. We also exclude studies that measure growth with GDP level. 
                                                          
7 The keywords for government size include government size, total government expenditure, government 
consumption, government spending, outlays, public spending, public expenditure and public consumption. Keywords 
for economic growth include economic growth, GDP, per capita income, growth, economic performance and 
economic activity. 
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Adhering to the above inclusion/exclusion criteria, we have constructed a sample of 799 effect-
size estimates reported in 87 primary studies. Online Appendix Table A1 summarizes the 
characteristics of the primary studies with respect to publication date/type, data type, estimation 
method and model, data period, measure of government size and country composition.  
Table A1 indicates that 59.77% of the studies rely on regression models with panel data, while 
17.24% rely on cross-section data. The remaining 22.99% rely on regression models with either 
time-series data or a mixture of various datasets. With regards to country composition, 29 studies 
(33.33% of total number of studies) use data on developed countries, while 18 studies (20.69%) 
use data on less developed countries. The remaining 40 studies (45.98%) use data on a mixture of 
developed and less developed countries. Finally, 74 out of the 87 primary studies are journal 
articles, while the remaining 13 are working papers and book chapters.  
3.1. Fixed-effect weighted means (FEWMs) 
Fixed-effect weighted means (hereafter, FEWMs) are calculated for estimates reported in each 
study. We cluster the estimates in each study by expenditure type and take the average (or mean) 
of estimates in each cluster. Rather than take simple means, we take weighted averages given that 
they are more reliable than simple means. Specifically, FEWMs assign lower weights to less 
precise estimates (i.e., estimates with large standard errors) and they are also less biased than 
random effects weighted means when primary-study estimates are affected by publication 
selection bias (Stanley, 2008; Henmi and Copas, 2010; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014). 
Tables 1A and 1B provide summary statistics, based on fixed-effect weighted means (FEWMs) 
and coefficients of variation per study.  
 Tables 1A and 1B Here  
The FEWMs for the effect of total government expenditure on per-capita GDP growth (Table 1A) 
indicate that 17 studies (32.08% of the total) report 84 estimates (20.44% of the total) that are 
insignificant; 26 studies (49.06%) report 201 estimates (48.90%) that are negative and significant; 
and 10 studies (18.87%) report 126 estimates (30.66%) that are positive and significant. Overall, 
the FEWM for 411 estimates is negative (-0.0083) but statistically insignificant at 95% confidence.   
With respect to the relationship between government consumption and economic growth (Table 
1B), FEWMs indicate that the effect is insignificant in 14 primary studies (30.43% of total studies) 
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that report 82 estimates (21.13% of the total). The effect is negative and significant in 31 studies 
(67.39%) reporting 290 estimates (74.75%). In the remaining one study with 16 estimates (4.12% 
of total estimates) the effect is positive and significant. The overall FEWM for all 388 estimates is 
negative (-0.1204) and significant with a 95% confidence interval. According to guidelines 
proposed by Cohen (1988) and Doucouliagos (2011), the FEWM indicates that the effect of 
government consumption on per-capita GDP is negative and small/medium.  
The balance of the evidence from FEWMs indicates that government consumption is detrimental 
to per-capita GDP growth, whereas government expenditure has no effect. This inference, 
however, must be qualified on two grounds.  
First, the evidence base is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity. The within-study 
coefficients of variations are between 0.1 (Adam and Bevan, 2005 in Table 1A; Barro 1991 and 
1996 in Table 1B) and 5.9 (Neycheva, 2010 in Table 1B) or as high as 11.7 (Mendoza et al, 1997 
in Table 1A).  Between-study variation is also high, ranging from -0.65 (Saunders, 1985) to +0.44 
(Bukiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2011) in the case of total government expenditure in Table 1A; and 
from -0.65 (Barro, 2001) to +0.18 (Cronovich, 1998) in the case of government consumption in 
Table 1B. These variations reduce the reliability of the inference derived from summary measures 
even if the latter are free of publication selection bias. To address this issue, we model the sources 
of heterogeneity explicitly and estimate their effects on the variation in the evidence base in Sub-
section 3.3. 
Secondly, the inference above is valid only if the effect-size estimates reported by primary studies 
are not subject to selection bias. We adopt funnel plots as well as funnel-asymmetry and precision-
effect tests (FAT/PET) in the next sub-section to examine whether selection bias exits and obtain 
average effect-size estimates corrected for selection bias.  
3.2. Investigating publication selection bias  
In the meta-analysis literature, a funnel plot is a useful way and a common trend to determine if 
publication bias exists. Thus, to visually inspect the possibility of publication bias, we first present 
funnel plots for the association between each government expenditure and growth. Funnel plots 
are scatter plots of effect sizes against their precision (1 𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖⁄ ). Figures 1 to 6 present funnel plots 
for the associations between government size and economic growth. Figures 1 to 3, which show 
the association between total government expenditure and growth, illustrate less asymmetry 
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considering our reference line, thus they suggest that there are no serious issues of publication 
selection bias. However, it might not be the case for Figures 4 to 6 that show the association 
between government consumption and growth. 
 [Insert Figures Here]  
 
While funnel plots may be useful in determining the presence or absence of publication selection 
bias, a visual inspection alone does not guarantee the presence or absence of publication bias. In 
addition, funnel plots are not useful in determining the magnitude or direction of bias, if any exists. 
Therefore, to thoroughly investigate issues of publication selection bias, we adopt the precision 
effect test (PET) and the funnel asymmetry test (FAT).  
The PET and FAT involve the estimation of a weighted least square bivariate model, in which the 
effect-size estimate is a linear function of its standard error (see Egger et al., 1997; Stanley, 2008). 
The theoretical rationale in Egger et al. (1997) is that researchers with small samples would search 
intensely across model specifications, econometric techniques and data measures to find 
sufficiently large (hence, statistically significant) effect-size estimates. However, Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2007) and Moreno et al. (2009) indicate that a quadratic specification for the 
relationship between effect size and its standard error is more appropriate if the Egger regression 
results indicate the presence of significant effect after controlling for selection bias. This 
specification is referred to as precision-effect estimate with standard errors (PEESE) which applies 
if the PET rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect (see Appendix). Thus, we run the PEESE 
analysis only when the coefficient of the precision is significant in the PET-FAT analysis.  
We estimate PET-FAT-PEESE models for two measures of government size: the ratio of total 
government expenditure to GDP and the ratio of government consumption to GDP. Our estimates 
are obtained using a hierarchical linear model (HLM) specification (Goldstein, 1995), whereby 
individual effect-size estimates are nested within studies reporting them. The choice is informed 
by likelihood ratio (LR) tests that compare the HLM with OLS; and the type of HLM is determined 
by additional LR tests that compare the random-intercepts specification with random-intercepts 
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and random-slopes specification.8 Estimation results are presented in Tables 2A and 2B, for two 
full samples and for two country types (developed and LDCs) within each sample.  
 Tables 2A and 2B Here  
Regarding total government expenditure and growth, we find no evidence of genuine effect in the 
full sample or in LDCs as the coefficient of the precision is statistically insignificant (columns 1 
and 3 of Table 2A). In the developed countries sample (column 2 of Table 2A), we find evidence 
of a negative effect (-0.13) without evidence of publication selection bias. This PET-FAT result is 
also supported by the PEESE result (column 4) with a slightly more adverse effect (-0.14). Thus, 
with respect to total government expenditure as a ratio of GDP, we report a negative partial 
correlation with growth in developed countries only. 
With regards to government consumption (fraction of GDP) and growth (Table 2B), we find 
evidence of a negative effect together with significant negative publication selection bias for the 
entire sample (column 1) and for the developed countries sample (column 2), but no significant 
effect for the LDC sample (column 3). PEESE results that correct for non-linear relations between 
effect-size estimates and their standard errors (columns 4 and 5) confirm the existence of negative 
effects for the full sample and for developed-country sample (-0.10 and -0.14, respectively).  
Statistical significance in the empirical literature has been clearly distinguished from economic (or 
practical) significance, especially when the size of a statistically significant coefficient is small 
(Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). Cohen (1988) indicates that an estimate represents a small effect if 
its absolute value is around 0.10, a medium effect if it is 0.25 and over and a large effect if it is 
greater than 0.4. Doucouliagos (2011) argues that the guidelines presented by Cohen (1988) 
understate the economic significance of empirical effect when partial correlation coefficients 
(PCCs) are used. Thus, Doucouliagos (2011) suggests that PCCs larger (smaller) than 0.07 in 
absolute value can be considered as medium (small) effects whereas those with an absolute value 
of 0.33 or above can be considered as indicators of large effect.  
                                                          
8 The HLM is employed to deal with data dependence by De Dominicis et al. (2008), Bateman and Jones (2003) and 
Alptekin and Levine (2012), among others. The likelihood ratio test results that compare HLM with OLS and the types 
of HLM structures are available on request. We run a series of robustness checks on our result using alternative 
estimation techniques such as the clustered data analysis (CDA) and these results are consistent with our main results. 
For brevity, these results are reported in the Online Appendix.  
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In the light of the guidance proposed by Doucouliagos (2011), these findings indicate that: (i) total 
government expenditure (as a fraction of GDP) has a medium and adverse effect on per-capita 
income growth in developed countries only; (ii) government consumption (as a fraction of GDP) 
has a medium and adverse effect on per-capita income growth in developed countries and when 
all countries are pooled together; and (iii) neither total government expenditure nor government 
consumption has a significant effect on per-capita income growth in LDCs.  
However, even PEESE results may have limited applicability when the underlying evidence base 
is highly heterogeneous. Indeed, the coefficients of variation for the full-sample PCCs in Table 1A 
and 1B are 9.11 and 1.28, respectively. In addition, the FEWMs and PEESE results are based on 
the assumption that, apart from the standard errors, all other moderating factors that affect the 
reported estimates are either zero (in the case of FEWMs) or at their sample means (in the case of 
PEESE). This assumption is too restrictive because the moderating factors that influence the effect-
size estimates reported in primary studies differ between studies and between estimates reported 
by the same study. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the moderating factors (i.e., the sources of 
variation) in the evidence base and quantify their influence on the effect-size estimates reported in 
primary studies. This is done in the next sub-section, followed by a detailed discussion of the 
implications for the government size – growth relationship in the conclusions and discussion 
section.    
3.3. Addressing Heterogeneity  
To identify the sources of heterogeneity and quantify their influence on the reported effect-size 
estimates, we estimate a multivariate meta-regression model (MRM) for each sample (i.e., for total 
government expenditure and government consumption). As indicated in the Appendix, we estimate 
a general and a specific MRM for each sample. The general specification includes all moderating 
factors that can be measured on the basis of the information we obtain from the primary studies. 
However, the inclusion of all observable moderating factors poses issues of over-determination 
and multicollinearity. Therefore, we follow a general-to-specific model routine, which involves 
the exclusion of the moderating variables with high p-values (highly insignificant variables) one 
at a time until all remaining variables are statistically significant.   
We utilize three sets of moderator variables, which are informed by the theoretical, empirical and 
methodological dimensions of the research field. The first set captures the variations in 
econometric specifications and theoretical models adopted by the primary studies. The second 
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captures data characteristics in primary studies and the third reflects the publication characteristics 
of the primary studies. Summary statistics for moderator variables and their description are 
presented in Tables 3A and 3B.  
 Tables 3A and 3B Here  
Results from the general and specific MRMs are presented in Table 4A (for total government 
expenditure) and Table 4B (for government consumption) below. The paragraphs below 
summarize the findings and interpret their implications for the relationship between government 
size and per-capita income growth. 
Moderator Set 1: Theoretical Models and Econometric Specifications 
Differences between theoretical models are captured through a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the reported effect-size estimates are obtained from an endogenous growth model, with 
Solow-type growth model used as base. Results in Table 4A indicate that the underlying theoretical 
model does not have a significant effect on reported effect-size estimates when the latter are about 
the effects of total government expenditure (fraction of GDP) on per-capita income growth. 
However, we note from Table 4B that studies that utilize an endogenous growth model tend to 
report more adverse effect-size estimates for the relationship between government consumption 
(fraction of GDP) and per-capita income growth.  
The endogenous growth theory offers two reasons as to why government consumption may not be 
conducive to higher levels of long-run growth (see, e.g., Romer, 1986; Barro, 1990; King and 
Rebelo, 1990; Lucas, 1990): (i) most government consumption is ‘unproductive’ (Parente and 
Prescott, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995); and (ii) taxes used to finance government 
consumption are distortionary (Barro, 1990; Parente and Prescott, 1991). Thus, endogenous 
growth theory predicts higher levels of government consumption lead to lower levels of long-run 
growth because higher distortionary taxes lead to lower levels of investment in productive 
activities. Specifically, higher capital income taxes that are used to finance government 
consumption can lead to lower levels of investment in technology adoption and the differences in 
these institutional taxes across countries can explain the diversity in long-run growth rate 
(e.g., Parente and Prescott, 1991). Although the theoretical construction is consistent, the problem 
arises from the linear specification of the relationship between the level of government 
consumption and the level of technology. Given that countries are heterogeneous in terms of 
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development levels, institutional structures and the composition of government consumption, a 
non-linear specification may be more appropriate. However, primary studies included in this meta-
analysis do not control for non-linear relationship between government size and growth.  
 Tables 4A and 4B Here  
With respect to econometric dimension, we first examine the difference between estimates based 
on cross-section data as opposed to panel data. This control is relevant because cross-section 
estimations overlook fixed effects that may reflect country-specific differences in preferences and 
technology. In the presence of fixed-effects, estimates based on cross-section data may yield biased 
results. For instance, Islam (1995) argues that country-specific effects that are ignored in cross-
section regressions could be correlated with included explanatory variables and this leads to 
omitted variable bias. Panel-data estimations can address this source of bias by purging the 
country-specific fixed effects and focusing on temporal variations in the data. However, the 
direction of bias (whether upward or downward) in the effect of government size on growth is not 
certain. Controlling for this econometric dimension in our meta-regressions allows us to draw a 
conclusion, based on the existing literature, on the direction of bias.    
In Table 4A where the focus is on total government expenditure, we find that the use of cross-
section data (as opposed to panel data) is associated with more adverse effects on growth, but the 
effect is insignificant. However, when government size is proxied by government consumption 
(Table 4B), the use of cross-section data is associated with more adverse effects; and the coefficient 
is significant. Given the potential bias associated with cross-section data, we interpret this finding 
as follows: inference about a negative relationship between government size and growth is likely 
to be biased when it is based on cross-section data only. Therefore, the received wisdom about a 
negative association between government consumption and growth should be qualified to the 
extent that it is informed by studies based on cross-section data – even though the data may be 
averaged over a long time period.  
The second dimension of the econometric specification we consider is model specification. In the 
empirical growth literature, it is well known that the inclusion (or exclusion) of certain regressors 
in growth regressions can affect the reported effect-size estimate.9 We include dummies for studies 
                                                          
9 For reviews of the literature on the importance of various variables, see Levine and Renelt (1992), Durlauf et al. 
(2005) and Glewwe et al. (2014). 
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that control for initial GDP per capita, investment share of GDP and population (growth or size). 
We also include a dummy for studies that control for government tax revenues in their growth 
regressions, given that the distortionary effects of taxation are a major factor in the debate on 
government size and growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) indicate that initial GDP per capita, 
investment share of GDP and population growth are important growth determinants, so parameter 
estimates may be biased if primary studies do not control for these factors (Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993; Agell et al., 1997). Other factors such as geography, institution and culture may also affect 
economic growth. These factors have been regarded as fundamental sources of growth by some 
recent studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002; Tabellini, 2010; Dell et al., 2012). However, very few 
studies reviewed in this meta-analysis control for these fundamental determinants in their growth 
regressions. The growth impacts of these fundamental determinants however may work through 
proximate determinants of growth such as investment (e.g., Rodrik et al., 2004). Thus, we focus 
our attention to the common set of growth determinants such as initial GDP per capita, investment 
share of GDP and population (growth or size) in our meta-regression analysis.  
MRM results in Tables 4A and 4B confirm that the inclusion of these variables in growth 
regressions tends to affect the estimates reported in primary studies. For instance, results for total 
government expenditure and government consumption show that studies that control 
for population (growth or size) or initial GDP (compared to those that do not) tend to report more 
adverse effects.  We therefore conclude that it would be good practice for researchers to include 
the key regressors in their regressions with a view to minimize the risk of model specification bias 
and the additional heterogeneity that would result from such biases.  
Another dimension of the econometric specification that may affect the reported estimates 
concerns the length of time over which both regressors and regressands are averaged. Two 
arguments can be put forward in favour of averaging. First, averaging over a period equal to the 
business cycle (usually five years) eliminates the effect of business cycle and this is particularly 
important if measures of business cycle (e.g., output gap) are not included in the model. Secondly, 
estimates based on data averaged over 5 years or more can be interpreted as medium- to long-run 
effects as opposed to short-run effects. Thus, to verify if estimates reported in primary studies are 
affected by the period of data averaging, we control for studies where data is averaged over five 
years or more, with others where annual data is used or the data is averaged over periods of less 
than 5 years as base. In both government consumption and total government expenditure samples, 
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we find that the data averaging period has no statistically significant effect on estimates reported 
in primary studies.  
We further examine the nature of reported estimates for studies that use panel data and adopt data 
averaging of 5 years or more and also those that use cross-section data with data averaging of 5 
years and above (as opposed to those that do not). In the total government expenditure 
specification, the coefficient for studies that use panel data with data averaging of 5 years or more 
is statistically insignificant. However, we find that studies that use cross-section data with data 
averaging of 5 years and above tend to report less adverse effects of government consumption on 
growth. This is an interesting finding because it indicates the effect of government consumption 
tends to be less adverse in the long run.  
This finding also indicates that the bias that results from failure to account for country fixed-effects 
in cross-section data is larger when the data averaging period is short. This is to be expected 
because country fixed effects are more likely to remain fixed over shorter time horizons. Another 
implication of this finding is that the relatively larger adverse effects reported by studies using 
cross-section data are likely to be driven by the dominance of the effect-size estimates based on 
short time horizons. 
The last dimension relating to econometric and theoretical specification concerns the econometric 
methodology used by primary studies. In the empirical growth literature, various econometric 
methods have been used and these methodologies aim at addressing specific issues. For instance, 
OLS estimates have been found to be inconsistent and biased in the presence of endogeneity. In 
the government size-growth literature, reverse causality is a potential problem and a source of 
endogeneity given that higher income countries have been identified to choose larger governments. 
This is consistent with Wagner’s Law which postulates that government size tends to grow with 
economic development. The ratchet effect, i.e., government size rises significantly during periods 
of crises and grows further after the crisis, is also often not accounted for in primary studies.  
Omitted variables bias could be another source of endogeneity. This bias emerges as a result of 
unobservable factors in the literature that relates government size to several political and economic 
variables (e.g., Karras, 1993; Gali, 1994; Fatás & Mihov, 2001). The growth literature refers to 
these unobservable factors as country-specific effects and they are usually ignored in cross-section 
regressions. Several studies also fail to control for relevant observable variables in growth 
regressions. For instance, a growing body of literature demonstrates the role of institutional 
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quality, culture and geography in growth (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2002; Tabellini, 2010; Dell et al., 
2012) but very few studies reviewed in this meta-analysis control for these factors in their growth 
regressions.  
To address endogeneity, some primary studies tend to use instrumental variable (IV) techniques 
such as 2SLS, 3SLS and GMM. Therefore, we control for studies that control for endogeneity as 
opposed to those that do not. The coefficient on the dummy for studies that control for endogeneity 
is positive and significant in the total government expenditure sample but insignificant in the 
government consumption sample. This finding suggests that the received wisdom about the 
adverse effect of government expenditure on growth may be informed by biased estimates from 
primary studies that do not control for heterogeneity. 
Moderator Set 2: Data Characteristics  
With regards to data characteristics, we first examine if the government size-growth relationship 
is time variant. Studies often re-examine the government size-growth relationship using different 
datasets when newer datasets become available. Since new datasets are likely to reveal different 
trends in government spending, we include dummy variables to capture the ‘recentness’ of data 
and how data time periods affect reported estimates. We include dummy variables to capture the 
decade in which the beginning year of the data period falls. For instance, “Data Period (1980+)” 
captures studies with data beginning in the 1980s. The excluded category is “Data period (1950+)”.  
MRA results for the total government expenditure sample mainly show statistically insignificant 
coefficients for data period dummies. However, from Table 4B coefficients for data period 
dummies are negative and statistically significant. Particularly, we note that the magnitude of the 
coefficient increases as the decades increase. Thus, the most adverse effect is observed for “Data 
Period 1990+”. This suggests that studies that use newer datasets tend to report more adverse 
effects of government consumption on growth. This is also the case for total government 
expenditure as the only included dummy in the specific model (Data Period 2000+), is negative 
and statistically significant as well.     
Our results therefore show that the use of data from more recent time periods is associated with 
increased adverse effect of government size on growth. This could be a result of the increased 
globalization and financial integration in recent times. Data from the World Trade Organization 
shows that the rate of globalization and economic integration proxied by trade levels has more than 
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doubled since the beginning of the 1970s. A large body of literature has demonstrated how 
increased globalization affects the size of government and various government spending policies 
(see, e.g., Rodrik, 1998; Garrett, 2001; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001; Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2007; 
Gastaldi & Liberati, 2011). For example, it has been argued that government spending and taxes 
tend to increase as governments try to ameliorate the adverse consequences of globalization for 
income volatility and inequalities (Rodrik, 1998; Gastaldi & Liberati, 2011). Therefore, the likely 
adverse effects of government size on growth should be evaluated in the light of where and why 
governments are spending limited resources and raising taxes to finance them.  
We also examine the effect of country type. Although the PET-FAT results reveal a negative effect 
of big government on growth in developed countries, it is worthwhile to control for this in our 
MRA as well. This ensures the inclusion of all relevant moderator variables that capture the 
necessary dimensions. We therefore control for studies that report estimates using data on 
developed countries as opposed to those that use data from LDCs and a mixture of both developed 
and LDCs. Results from Table 4A confirm what the PET-FAT results suggest. The developed 
country dummy is significant and negative, suggesting that studies that use data on developed 
countries tend to report more adverse effects of total government expenditure on growth compared 
to those that use LDC samples and mixed samples. From Table 4B, the coefficient of studies that 
use developed countries data is also negative but insignificant.  
Moderator Set 3: Publication Characteristics 
Under the publication characteristics dimension, we first control for publication type. Here, we 
examine if journal articles tend to systematically report different effect sizes in comparison to book 
chapters and working papers. This allows us to determine whether researchers, authors and editors 
are predisposed to publishing and/or accepting studies with statistically significant results that are 
consistent with theory to justify model selection. Using book chapters and working papers as base, 
we include a dummy for journal articles in our MRA specification. Results reveal that studies 
published in journals tend to report less adverse effects of government size on growth. This is 
consistent across both measures of government size and specification type (i.e., both general and 
general-to-specific).  
Furthermore, we examine if perceived quality of the publication outlet is associated with variations 
in reported estimates. We measure perceived publication outlet quality using two sources of 
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journal ranking data.10 From Table 4A, the coefficient for studies published in high-ranked journals 
is statistically insignificant. However, studies published in high-ranked journals tend to report 
more adverse effects of government consumption on growth (Table 4B).   
Next, we control for publication year. Examining publication year enables us to identify whether 
more recent studies, as opposed to older studies, tend to report different estimates. Thus, we 
include dummy variables similar to those constructed for data period. For instance, studies 
published between 1998 and 2013 fall under “Publication Year (1990+)” and those published 
between 2001 and 2013 fall under “Publication Year (2000+)”. Leaving 1980+ as base, we control 
for studies published in the decades starting 1990, 2000 and 2010. In both government 
consumption and total government expenditure specifications, publication year dummies are 
significant; but they do not reflect a consistent pattern. Hence, we conclude that it is not possible 
to infer whether newer studies tend to report more or less adverse effects compared to studies 
published before them.  
3.3.1. Robustness check 
For robustness checks, we run additional regressions using different variables to capture the 
dimensions of the research field pertaining to data period, publication dates, journal quality and 
data type. With regards to data period, we include a dummy variable which captures studies that 
include data from anywhere before the 1980s (inclusive) and a second dummy variable which 
captures studies that include data for the 1990s and 2000s. We exclude studies that have a mixture 
of these two groups as base. MRA results indicate that the government size-growth effect changes 
over time and hence is time variant. Specifically, consistent with our main results, newer datasets 
tend to report more adverse effects of government size on growth.   
For publication date, we include a dummy for studies that were published in the 2000s, leaving 
out other publication years as base. We find that in the total expenditure-growth literature, the year 
of study publication does not affect the nature of reported estimates. However, in the government 
consumption-growth literature, we find that more recent publications tend to report more 
                                                          
10 The Australian Business Dean’s Council (ABDC) and the Australian Research Council (ARC) present 
classifications for journal quality. Journals are ranked in descending order of quality as A*, A, B and C. Thus, we 
introduce a dummy for A* and A ranked journals (high quality) in our MRA and use other ranks as base. 
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negatively on the effects of government consumption on growth and this is consistent with our 
main results which use a different classification for publication dates.  
With regards to journal rank, our main results classify A* and A ranked journals into one category. 
We examine if results related to journal rankings are robust to a further distinction between A* 
and A. Thus, we include two dummy variables capturing A* and A ranked journals independently. 
We find that the dummy for A* ranked studies is significant, while that of A ranked studies is not. 
Lastly, we examine if there are any systematic differences in estimates reported by primary studies 
using time-series data and those using cross-section. Thus, we include a dummy for cross-section 
studies (as opposed to those using time-series data). We find that cross-section studies tend to 
report more negatively on the impact of government size on growth. Overall, results from these 
regressions are consistent with our main results. Given space constraints, these results are reported 
in the Online Appendix. 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper reviews the empirical literature on the association between government size and 
economic growth. We focus on total government expenditure and government consumption 
expenditure (as a share of GDP) as measures of government size. Results are based on a synthesis 
of 87 studies solely examining the effect of the government size on per-capita GDP growth. We 
control for publication selection bias and address issues of heterogeneity in the existing literature.     
Bivariate meta-regression results reported above indicate that the average effect of government 
size on growth, using both proxies of government size, is medium and negative in developed 
countries. The average effect of total government expenditure is insignificant in both LDCs and 
mixed-country samples (i.e., when developed and LDCs are pooled together). On the other hand, 
the average effect of government consumption is insignificant in LDCs, but it is medium and 
negative in both developed countries and mixed-country samples.  
These findings suggest that the existing evidence does not support an overall inference that 
establishes a negative relationship between government size and per-capita income growth for 
several reasons including: (i) potential biases induced by reverse causality between government 
size and per-capita income; (ii) lack of control for country-specific effects in cross-section studies; 
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and (iii) absence of control for non-linear relationships between government size and per-capita 
GDP growth. 
Furthermore, the effect is specific to the level of development: a larger government size tends to 
have a negative effect on per-capita income growth as the level of income increases. This finding 
ties in with the Armey curve hypothesis (Armey, 1995) which posits an inverted-U relationship 
between government size and economic growth. A small government can enhance economic 
growth by providing a conducive institutional environment characterized by rule of law and 
protection of property rights, which are often regarded as important factors for economic growth. 
However, when an economy becomes richer, the size of the government tends to grow beyond its 
efficient level, so a further rise in government size would hamper economic growth. There are 
several possible reasons for this argument. First, government size may be characterized by 
decreasing returns when government size is sufficiently large. The second reason is related  to the 
distortionary nature of taxes, which is minimal for low levels of taxation, but beyond a certain 
threshold, they grow rapidly and become extremely large (e.g., Barro, 1990; Agell, 1996) to have 
adverse effects on saving, investment and other forms of productive behaviour. Third, rent-seeking 
activities tend to increase in countries with larger governments (Buchanan 1980). Hence, our 
findings suggest that estimates of the relationship between government size and growth obtained 
from linear estimations may be biased (see also, Barro, 1990).  
In addition, developed countries tend to have well-developed systems of automatic stabilisers such 
as social security expenditure and progressive taxation. According to the World Social Security 
Report 2010/11, Europe spends between 20 and 30 per cent of GDP on social security, while in 
most African countries social security spending accounts only for 4–6 per cent of GDP.  
According to Devarajan et al. (1996), social security expenditure is unproductive and as such they 
may be driving the negative relationship between government size and per-capita income growth 
in developed countries. However, social security expenditure and other forms of automatic 
stabilisers may be conducive to lower growth rates because of the reverse causality they inject into 
the government size-growth relationship. As indicated by Bergh and Henrekson (2011), automatic 
stabilisers on the expenditure sides would increase as GDP falls. This well-known feature of the 
automatic stabilisers introduces a negative bias in the estimates for the effect of government size 
on growth. The risk of such bias is higher in developed countries with higher incidence of 
automatic stabilisers. Indeed, this risk of bias is confirmed by our findings that the effect of 
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government size is less adverse: (i) in developing as opposed to developed countries; and (ii) in 
studies that control for endogeneity as opposed to those that do not.  
Furthermore, the more pronounced negative effects for developed countries may be related to 
Wagner’s Law, which indicates that government size increases with the level of income. There is 
evidence indicating that the long-run elasticity of government size with respect to growth in 
developed countries is large (Lamartina and Zaghini, 2011). In this case, the government size-GDP 
ratio for developed countries will grow faster than LDCs for a given increase in GDP. This 
additional endogeneity problem leads to what Roodman (2008) describes as ‘the looking glass 
problem: if the government size-GDP ratio increases with GDP (i.e., if Wagner’s Law holds), then 
the stronger negative effects reported on developed countries may be due to either lack of control 
for endogeneity in the growth regressions or absence of adequate instruments or both.  
With regards to other sources of heterogeneity, we find that model specification, study design and 
sample used by primary studies do affect effect-size estimates. Our findings complement those of 
Nijkamp and Poot (2004), who report that cross-section studies are more likely to report 
detrimental effects of big government on economic growth. 
We also find that studies published in journals tend to report less adverse effects compared to 
working papers and book chapters. This is consistent across both measures of government size and 
thus raises the question as to whether the negative association between government size and per-
capita income growth may be driven by less rigorous external reviewing processes in the case of 
book chapters and working papers. However, we do not wish to overemphasize this because in the 
government consumption sample, we find that studies published in higher-ranked journals tend to 
report more adverse effects of government size on growth. This may be an indication of the 
‘Winner’s curse’ - whereby journals with good reputation capitalize on their reputation and publish 
‘more selected’ findings (see Costa-Font et al., 2013; Ugur, 2014).  
In conclusion, our findings show that where an evidence base is too diverse, meta-analysis can be 
highly effective in synthesizing the evidence base and accounting for the sources of heterogeneity 
among reported findings. Our findings in this study indicate that government size is more likely to 
be associated with negative effects on per-capita income growth in developed countries. They also 
indicate that the medium-sized adverse effects in developed countries may be biased due to 
endogeneity and reverse causality problems, which are either unaddressed in a large segment of 
the evidence base or the instruments used to address these problems are weak or both. Therefore, 
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we call for caution in establishing casual links between government size and per-capita income 
growth. We also call for use of non-linear models in the estimation of the government size – growth 
relationship. As indicated by Agell (1996), non-linear models may provide richer evidence on the 
optimal government size, particularly when the latter is measured in terms of tax revenues. Finally, 
as indicated by Kneller et al. (1999), Poot (2000) and Bergh and Henrekson (2011), we call for 
further research on the relationship between particular components of the government size and 
growth as such studies are more likely to produce policy-relevant findings compared to studies 
that focus on total measures of government size. 
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Table 1A: Fixed-effect weighted means (FEWMs) - Total government expenditure and growth  
Study Number of 
estimates 
FEWM *Coeff. of 
variation  
Significant Conf. interval 
Adam and Bevan (2005) 9 0.2256 0.1128 Yes (0.2060, 0.2452) 
Afonso and Furceri (2010) 10 -0.3092 0.2295 Yes (-0.3600, -0.2585) 
Afonso and Jalles (2014) 12 -0.1651 0.5900 Yes (-0.2270, -0.1032) 
Afonso and Jalles (2013) 13 -0.1292 0.5945 Yes (-0.1756, -0.0828) 
Afonso et al. (2010) 32 0.0411 0.3841 Yes (0.0354, 0.0468) 
Agell et al. (1997) 3 -0.0828 1.7525 No (-0.4430, 0.2775) 
Angelopoulos et al. (2007) 2 -0.2819 0.3554 No (-1.1819, 0.6181) 
Angelopoulos et al. (2008) 18 -0.2245 1.0092 Yes (-0.3372, -0.1119) 
Arin (2004) 20 -0.2822 0.3048 Yes (-0.3224, -0.2419) 
Bergh and Karlsson (2010) 9 -0.2652 0.3208 Yes (-0.3306, -0.1998) 
Bergh and Öhrn (2011) 9 0.0082 2.6514 No (-0.1338, 0.1501) 
Bernhard (2001) 2 -0.3843 0.1833 No (-1.0173, 0.2486) 
Bojanic (2013) 14 0.3319 0.6608 Yes (0.2053, 0.4586) 
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Kalaitzidakis and Tzouvelekas (2011) 1 0.1004 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Kelly (1997) 4 -0.1877 0.5738 Yes (-0.3592, -0.0163) 
Lee and Lin (1994) 8 -0.2569 0.2145 Yes (-0.3030, -0.2108) 
Levine and Renelt (1992) 3 -0.1931 0.5896 No (-0.4758, 0.0897) 
Marlow (1986) 6 -0.5519 0.4461 Yes (-0.8102, -0.2935) 
Martin and Fardmanesh (1990) 12 0.0361 1.9956 No (-0.0097, 0.0820) 
Mendoza et al. (1997) 3 -0.0059 11.7364 No (-0.1789, 0.1670) 
Miller and Russek (1997) 6 -0.1767 0.5151 Yes (-0.2721, -0.0812) 
Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) 1 -0.3985 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Odedokun (1997) 1 -0.0267 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Plümper and Martin (2003) 2 -0.1319 0.3782 No (-1.1055, 0.8417) 
Ram (1986) 8 -0.2074 0.6273 Yes (-0.3243, -0.0905) 
Romer (1989) 3 -0.3026 0.0105 Yes (-0.5869, -0.0183) 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) 3 -0.1534 3.7126 No (-0.3934, 0.0858) 
Sala-I-Martin (1995) 2 -0.3420 0.3523 Yes (-0.3743, -0.3096) 
Sattar (1993) 9 0.0047 3.7126 No (-0.0087, 0.0181) 
Saunders (1985) 2 -0.6847 0.3523 No (-2.8519, 1.4825) 
Saunders (1988) 12 -0.5150 0.5613 Yes (-0.6987, -0.3313) 
Scully (1989) 4 0.2639 0.0969 Yes (0.2232, 0.3046) 
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) 5 -0.1561 0.9438 No (-0.3391, 0.0268) 
Tanninen (1999) 1 -0.0360 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Yan and Gong (2009) 8 0.0594 2.7707 No (-0.0782, 0.1970) 
Government expenditure overall 411 -0.0083 9.1092 No (-0.0238, 0.0071) 
*Absolute values reported 
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Table 1B: Fixed-effect weighted means (FEWMs) - Government consumption and growth  
Study Number of 
estimates 
FEWM *Coeff. of 
variation  
Significant Conf. interval 
Afonso and Furceri (2010) 4 -0.3023 0.3793 Yes (-0.4847, -0.1199) 
Afonso and Jalles (2014) 18 -0.0742 2.4684 No (-0.1652, 0.0169) 
Afonso and Jalles (2013) 8 -0.1326 0.5046 Yes (-0.1886, -0.0767) 
Andrés et al. (1996) 2 -0.0388 0.3888 No (-0.1745, 0.0968) 
Angelopoulos and Philippopoulos (2007) 6 -0.3752 0.5452 Yes (-0.5899, -0.1605) 
Angelopoulos et al. (2008) 18 -0.1868 0.3702 Yes (-0.2211, -0.1524) 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 24 -0.3670 0.2985 Yes (-0.4133, -0.3208) 
Barro (1989) 5 -0.4445 0.1340 Yes (-0.5185, -0.3705) 
Barro (1991) 20 -0.4226 0.1346 Yes (-0.4492, -0.3960) 
Barro (1996) 8 -0.2810 0.0827 Yes (-0.3004, -0.2615) 
Barro (2001) 1 -0.6490 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bellettini and Ceroni (2000) 24 -0.2127 0.6031 Yes (-0.2669, -0.1585) 
Bernhard (2001) 1 -0.2551 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Brumm (1997) 1 -0.1385 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2011) 29 -0.1069 0.7060 Yes (-0.1356, -0.0782) 
Castro (2011) 12 -0.3450 0.2771 Yes (-0.4058, -0.2843) 
Commander et al. (1999) 9 -0.2173 0.3288 Yes (-0.2722, -0.1624) 
Cooray (2009) 5 0.0166 1.3136 No (-0.0105, 0.0436) 
Cronovich (1998) 4 0.1820 0.8977 No (-0.0780, 0.4420) 
De Gregorio (1992) 5 -0.1562 0.8494 No (-0.3209, 0.0085) 
Dowrick (1996) 11 -0.0782 0.7209 Yes (-0.1160, -0.0403) 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 3 -0.0429 0.3829 Yes (-0.0837, -0.0021) 
Fölster and Henrekson (2001) 2 -0.3816 0.2618 No (-1.2790, 0.5159) 
Garrison and Lee (1995) 4 0.0129 1.6873 No (-0.0217, 0.0475) 
Ghura (1995) 6 -0.1737 0.0863 Yes (-0.1894, -0.1580) 
Grier and Tullock (1989) 10 -0.2261 0.9932 Yes (-0.3867, -0.0655) 
Grossman (1990) 16 0.0583 1.2122 Yes (0.0207, 0.0960) 
Guseh (1997) 8 -0.0692 1.5077 No (-0.1565, 0.0180) 
Hansson and Henrekson (1994) 6 -0.1967 0.6395 Yes (-0.3288, -0.0647) 
Landau (1983) 14 -0.2222 0.6145 Yes (-0.3010, -0.1433) 
Landau (1986) 12 -0.1025 0.6618 Yes (-0.1456, -0.0594) 
Landau (1997) 8 -0.0311 1.3723 No (-0.0668, 0.0046) 
Lee (1995) 4 -0.3022 0.1994 Yes (-0.3981, -0.2063) 
Levine and Renelt (1992) 10 -0.2199 0.6508 Yes (-0.3224, -0.1176) 
Mo (2007) 10 -0.4806 0.1761 Yes (-0.5411, -0.4200) 
Murphy et al. (1991) 2 -0.3039 0.4310 No (-1.4809, 0.8730) 
Neycheva (2010) 13 -0.0206 5.9556 No (-0.0947, 0.0535) 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) 5 -0.1177 0.6042 Yes (-0.2060, -0.0294) 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) 20 -0.4523 0.1173 Yes (-0.4771, -0.4274) 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) 1 -0.3117 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Saunders (1986) 3 -0.6488 0.2878 Yes (-1.1127, -0.1849) 
Sheehey (1993) 6 0.1093 2.5298 No (-0.1809, 0.3994) 
Tanninen (1999) 3 -0.1855 2.8551 No (-1.5008, 1.1299) 
Zhang and Casagrande (1998) 2 -0.4291 0.0306 Yes (-0.5470, -0.3111) 
d’Agostino et al. (2010) 2 -0.1173 0.6149 No (-0.7651, 0.5306) 
d'Agostino et al. (2012) 3 -0.1833 0.1279 Yes (-0.2416, -0.1251) 
Government consumption overall 388 -0.1204 1.2846 Yes (-0.1359, -0.1049) 
*Absolute values reported 
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Table 2A Total government expenditure and growth 
PET-FAT and PEESE Results 
 A. PET-FAT B. PEESE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Entire Dataset Developed LDCs Developed 
     
Precision (𝛽0) -0.0317 -0.1311*** -0.0700 -0.1397*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0459) (0.0467) (0.0316) 
Bias (𝛼0) -0.5963 0.0275 1.0715  
 (0.4042) (0.7804) (0.7519)  
Std. Error    4.9584 
    (3.3918) 
     
Observations 411 165 139 165 
No of studies in cluster 53 28 22 28 
Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the study level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Panel A reports PET/FAT results; and Panel B reports results that take account of quadratic relationship between effect size and its standard error (PEESE). 
PEESE results are reported only when PET/FAT results indicate significant effect after controlling for selection bias. 
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Table 2B Government consumption and growth 
PET-FAT and PEESE Results 
  A. PET-FAT     B. PESEE  
 (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5)  
VARIABLES Entire Dataset Developed LDCs    Entire Dataset Developed  
          
Precision (𝛽0) -0.0474*** -0.0862** -0.0091    -0.0996*** -0.1397***  
 (0.0182) (0.0403) (0.0320)    (0.0141) (0.0260)  
Bias (𝛼0) -1.5525*** -1.1544* -1.4529**       
 (0.3595) (0.6206) (0.7231)       
Std. error       -2.7107 -2.3687  
       (2.0915) (3.0106)  
Observations 388 105 70    388 105  
No of studies in cluster 46 19 14    46 19  
Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the study level. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Panel A reports PET/FAT results; and Panel B reports results that take account of quadratic relationship between effect size and its standard error (PEESE). 
PEESE results are reported only when PET/FAT results indicate significant effect after controlling for selection bias. 
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Table 3A Summary Statistics – Total Expenditure 
Variables Definition  N Mean  S.D. Min Max 
𝑡-value t-statistics reported in primary studies 411 -0.66 2.79 -12.17 6.33 
Precision Inverse of standard error of the partial correlation coefficient  411 15.07 9.99 3.16 51.03 
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 Standard errors of the partial correlation coefficients 411 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.32 
Developed Takes value 1 if the primary study data is from developed countries, otherwise 0 411 5.09 7.39 0 29.36 
LDCs  Takes value 1 if the primary study data is from LDCs, otherwise 0 411 4.26 6.71 0 33.33 
Time Series Takes value 1 if Time Series is used by primary study, otherwise 0 411 0.55 2.01 0 10.84 
Cross-section  Takes value 1 if cross-section data is used by primary study, 0 if panel is used 411 0.64 2.13 0 11.04 
Panel Data Takes value 1 if panel data is used by primary study, otherwise 0 411 13.88 11.17 0 51.03 
Control for Endogeneity Takes value 1 if primary study controls for endogeneity, otherwise 0 411 2.22 5.35 0 22.41 
Endogenous Growth Model Takes value 1 if the model is based on endogenous growth model, otherwise 0. 411 0.06 0.75 0 10.11 
Data Average (=>5) Takes value 1 if data averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 411 6.05 7.03 0 23.36 
Data Average*Panel Data Takes value 1 if study used panel data and averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 411 6.94 7.23 0 27.50 
Data Average*Cross Section Takes value 1 if study used cross section and averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 411 0.64 2.13 0 11.04 
Data Period (1960+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1960, otherwise 0 411 12.97 11.51 0 51.03 
Data Period (1970+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1970, otherwise 0 411 8.38 12.48 0 51.03 
Data Period (1980+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1980, otherwise 0 411 11.19 7.43 0 44.44 
Data Period (1990+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1990, otherwise 0 411 13.29 10.98 0 51.03 
Data Period (2000+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 2000, otherwise 0 411 14.19 10.45 0 51.03 
Initial GDP Takes value 1 if the primary study control for initial per capita GDP, otherwise 0 411 5.49 7.02 0 26.26 
Population  Takes value 1 if the primary study control for population, otherwise 0 411 1.84 4.10 0 18.71 
Investment  Takes value 1 if the primary study control for investment, otherwise 0 411 5.98 8.04 0 44.44 
Tax Takes value 1 if the primary study control for taxes, otherwise 0 411 3.99 7.01 0 27.50 
Journal Rank Takes value 1 if the primary study is published in high-ranked journal, otherwise 0 411 6.79 7.32 0 29.69 
Journal  Takes value 1 if the primary study is published in a journal, otherwise 0 411 10.48 7.71 0 44.44 
Publication Year (1990+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=1990, otherwise 0 411 3.05 7.29 0 44.44 
Publication Year (2000+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=2000, otherwise 0 411 4.67 6.79 0 29.69 
Publication Year (2010+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=2010, otherwise 0 411 6.79 12.09 0 51.03 
Notes: weighted variables are divided by 𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 
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Table 3B Summary Statistics – Government Consumption 
Variables Definition  N Mean  S.D. Min Max 
𝑡-value t-statistics reported in primary studies 388 -2.24 2.13 -10.32 3.53 
Precision Inverse of standard error of the partial correlation coefficient  388 13.49 8.17 3.25 43.49 
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 Standard errors of the partial correlation coefficients 388 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.31 
Developed  Takes value 1 if the primary study data is from developed countries, otherwise 0 388 3.33 6.34 0 26.94 
LDCs  Takes value 1 if the primary study data is from LDCs, otherwise 0 388 3.54 8.68 0 39.73 
Time Series Takes value 1 if Time Series is used by primary study, otherwise 0 388 0.08 0.67 0 6.48 
Cross-section  Takes value 1 if cross-section data is used by primary study, 0 if panel is used 388 2.91 4.87 0 24.89 
Panel Data Takes value 1 if panel data is used by primary study, otherwise 0 388 10.49 10.30 0 43.49 
Control for Endogeneity Takes value 1 if primary study controls for endogeneity, otherwise 0 388 1.99 5.03 0 26.45 
Endogenous Growth Model Takes value 1 if the model is based on endogenous growth model, otherwise 0. 388 0.26 1.59 0 11.01 
Data Average (=>5) Takes value 1 if data averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 388 7.28 7.47 0 27.16 
Data Average*Panel Data Takes value 1 if study used panel data and averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 388 5.19 7.57 0 27.16 
Data Average*Cross Section Takes value 1 if study used cross section and averaging period is =>5 years otherwise 0 388 2.09 4.49 0 24.89 
Data Period (1960+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1960, otherwise 0 388 7.49 9.15 0 43.49 
Data Period (1970+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1970, otherwise 0 388 9.12 8.91 0 42.60 
Data Period (1980+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1980, otherwise 0 388 12.80 8.52 0 12.51 
Data Period (1990+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 1990, otherwise 0 388 12.11 9.02 0 25.26 
Data Period (2000+) Takes value 1 if data year>= 2000, otherwise 0 388 0.14 1.23 0 11.01 
Initial GDP Takes value 1 if the primary study control for initial per capita GDP, otherwise 0 388 8.48 8.32 0 43.49 
Population  Takes value 1 if the primary study control for population, otherwise 0 388 5.09 7.59 0 26.94 
Investment  Takes value 1 if the primary study control for investment, otherwise 0 388 7.25 7.95 0 42.60 
Tax Takes value 1 if the primary study control for taxes, otherwise 0 388 2.49 7.62 0 43.49 
Journal Rank Takes value 1 if the primary study is published in high-ranked journal, otherwise 0 388 8.68 9.88 0 43.49 
Journal  Takes value 1 if the primary study is published in a journal, otherwise 0 388 11.96 9.27 0 43.49 
Publication Year (1990+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=1990, otherwise 0 388 6.89 8.38 0 34.36 
Publication Year (2000+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=2000, otherwise 0 388 11.79 9.36 0 43.49 
Publication Year (2010+) Takes value 1 if publication year>=2010, otherwise 0 388 3.16 6.56 0 27.16 
Notes: weighted variables are divided by 𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖  
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Table 4A – MRA (Total Government Expenditure and Growth) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES General Model General-to-Specific Model 
   
Precision  -0.0049 0.0397 
 (0.1450) (0.0880) 
Theoretical and econometric dimensions 
Control for Endogeneity 0.0671*** 0.0649*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0203) 
Cross Section -0.0828  
 (0.1182)  
Endogenous Growth Model 0.3139  
 (0.2669)  
Data Average (=>5 years) 0.0005  
 (0.0812)  
Data Average*Panel Data  -0.0192  
 (0.0778)  
Population  -0.1733** -0.1739*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0605) 
Initial GDP -0.1684*** -0.1733*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0375) 
Investment  -0.0640* -0.0574* 
 (0.0366) (0.0347) 
Data Characteristics 
Data Period (1960+) 0.0257  
 (0.0319)  
Data Period (1970+) 0.0215  
 (0.0501)  
Data Period (1980+) -0.0327  
 (0.0673)  
Data Period (1990+) 0.0055  
 (0.0613)  
Data Period (2000+) -0.1271 -0.1232* 
 (0.0915) (0.0698) 
Developed  -0.0280* -0.0312** 
 (0.0170) (0.0159) 
Publication Characteristics 
Journal Rank 0.0319  
 (0.0471)  
Journal  0.1963*** 0.1894*** 
 (0.0635) (0.0483) 
Publication Year (1990+) -0.0749 -0.0921* 
 (0.0804) (0.0540) 
Publication Year (2000+) -0.0604 -0.0839* 
 (0.0704) (0.0430) 
Publication Year (2010+) 0.1525** 0.1682*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0451) 
Constant 0.8082* 0.7136 
 (0.4646) (0.4440) 
   
Observations 411 411 
Number of studies 53 53 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4B – MRA (Government Consumption and Growth) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES General Model General-to-Specific Model 
   
Precision  0.0730 0.1776 
 (0.1510) (0.1256) 
Theoretical and econometric dimensions 
Control for Endogeneity 0.0258  
 (0.0243)  
Cross Section -0.2738*** -0.2328*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0579) 
Endogenous Growth Model -0.1378** -0.1226** 
 (0.0609) (0.0603) 
Data Average (=>5) -0.0234  
 (0.0304)  
Data Average*Cross-section 0.1320* 0.1029* 
 (0.0733) (0.0634) 
Population  -0.0766*** -0.0713*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0243) 
Initial GDP 0.0255  
 (0.0234)  
Tax  -0.0372  
 (0.0227)  
Investment  0.0935*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0194) 
Data Characteristics 
Data Period (1960+) -0.0685 -0.0837** 
 (0.0469) (0.0425) 
Data Period (1970+) -0.0982** -0.1216*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0402) 
Data Period (1980+) -0.1212** -0.1487*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0475) 
Data Period (1990+) -0.2304*** -0.2760*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0501) 
Developed  -0.0137  
 (0.0180)  
Publication Characteristics 
Journal Rank -0.0761*** -0.0866*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0265) 
Journal  0.2114*** 0.2040*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0424) 
Publication Year (1990+) 0.0530** 0.0408* 
 (0.0241) (0.0231) 
Publication Year (2000+) 0.1911*** 0.1921*** 
 (0.0386) (0.0360) 
Publication Year (2010+) -0.1667*** -0.1822*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0312) 
Constant -1.0983*** -1.0963*** 
 (0.2867) (0.2747) 
   
Observations 388 388 
Number of studies 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 1 – 3 (Total Government Expenditure and Growth) 
Entire Dataset (1) Developed Countries Sample (2) 
  
LDCs Sample (3) 
  
 
Figures 4 – 6 (Government Consumption and Growth) 
Entire Dataset (4) Developed Countries Sample (5) 
  
LDCs Sample (6) 
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Appendix – Overview of Methods 
1. Partial Correlation Coefficients (PCCs) 
PCCs measure the association between government expenditure and per-capita GDP growth. Given that they 
are independent of the metrics used in measuring both independent and dependent variables, they allow for 
the comparability of studies and reported effect-size estimates. They are mostly used in meta-analysis (see 
e.g. Alptekin and Levine, 2012; Ugur; 2014; Benos and Zotou, 2014).  
We use equations (A1) and (A2) to calculate a PCC and standard error, respectively, for each relevant effect-
size estimate reported by primary studies.  
 
𝑟𝑖 =
𝑡𝑖
√𝑡𝑖
2 + 𝑑𝑓𝑖
 
(A1) 
and 
 
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 = √
1 − 𝑟𝑖
2
𝑑𝑓𝑖
 
  (A2) 
𝑟𝑖 and 𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 represent PCC and its associated standard errors, respectively.  𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖 represents variations due to 
sampling error and its inverse is used as weight in the calculation of study-by-study fixed-effect weighted 
averages. 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑑𝑓𝑖 represent 𝑡-value and degrees of freedom, respectively, associated with estimates reported 
in primary studies.  
2. Fixed Effect Weighted Means 
We calculate FEEs using (A3) below.  
?̅?𝐹𝐸𝐸 =
∑ 𝑟𝑖 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖
2 )
∑
1
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖
2
 
(A3) 
?̅?𝐹𝐸𝐸 is the fixed effect weighted average and all other variables remain as explained before. FEEs account 
for within-study variations by assigning higher weights to more precise estimates and lower weights to less 
precise estimates.  
3. Bivariate meta-regressions  
To estimate ‘genuine effect’ beyond publication selection bias, we draw on meta-regression analysis (MRA) 
models proposed and developed by Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, 2014). The 
underpinning theoretical framework is that of Egger et al. (1997), who postulate that researchers with small 
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samples and large standard errors would search intensely across model specifications, econometric techniques 
and data measures to find sufficiently large (hence statistically significant) effect-size estimates. Hence:   
𝑒𝑖 =  𝛽 + 𝛼𝑆𝐸𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (A4) 
Here, 𝑒𝑖 is the effect-size reported in primary studies and 𝑆𝐸𝑖 is the associated standard error. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis of 𝛼 = 0 indicates the presence of publication bias. This is also known as the funnel-
asymmetry test (FAT), which evaluates the asymmetry of the funnel graphs that chart the effect-size estimates 
against their precisions. Testing for 𝛽 = 0 is known as precision-effect test (PET), and allows for establishing 
whether genuine effect exists beyond selection bias.  
However, estimating (A4) poses several issues. First, the model is heteroskedastic: effect-size estimates have 
widely different standard errors (hence variances), violating the assumption of independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) error term (𝑢𝑖). To address this issue, Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) 
propose a weighted least squares (WLS) version, obtained by dividing both sides of (A4) with precision 
(1/𝑆𝐸𝑖).  
Secondly, primary-study estimates may be affected by data dependence, which arises when primary studies 
using a particular dataset report multiple estimates or when different studies use overlapping segments of the 
country data compiled by national statistical agencies (Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009). Clustered data 
analysis (CDA), an approach often used in the meta-analysis literature, only corrects the standard errors for 
within-study dependence. However, hierarchical linear models (HLMs) allow for robust standard errors 
clustered on studies and take account of both within-study and between-study dependence explicitly. We 
model data dependence by allowing for random variation between study-specific estimates, which may be due 
to study-specific intercepts and/or study-specific slopes (Demidenko, 2004; McCulloch et al., 2008). Stated 
differently, estimates reported by primary studies are nested within each study; and the estimates are modelled 
to differ between studies either because they share a common intercept (a fixed component) and/or a common 
slope within each primary study. The HLM can be stated as follows:  
𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖𝑗
) + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
(A5) 
where 𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the 𝑡-value associated with effect-size estimate 𝑖 (i.e., the partial correlation coefficient calculated 
using A1) of study 𝑗; 𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖𝑗 is the corresponding standard calculated in accordance with (A2); 𝑣𝑗  is the study-
level random effect; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the multivariate-normal error term with mean zero. The random effects (𝑣𝑗) are 
not estimated directly, but their variance (or standard error) is. We conclude in favour of publication selection 
bias if 𝛼0 is statistically significant at conventional levels. In the presence of publication bias, 𝛼0 determines 
the magnitude and the direction of bias.  Similarly, we conclude in favour of genuine effect beyond selection 
bias if 𝛽0 is statistically significant at conventional levels.    
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The third issue is that Egger et al. (1997) assume a linear relationship between primary-study estimates and 
their standard errors. However, Moreno et al. (2009) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) provide simulation 
evidence indicating that a quadratic specification is superior if ‘genuine effect’ exists beyond selection bias – 
i.e., if the PET in (A5) rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect. Then, the correct specification is referred to 
as precision-effect test corrected for standard errors (PEESE) and can be stated as follows: 
𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖𝑗
) +  𝛼0(𝑆𝐸𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
(A6) 
Given that study-level random effects may be observed at the intercept or slope levels or both, we establish 
which type of HML is appropriate using LR tests, where the null hypothesis is that the preferred specification 
is nested within the comparator specification.  Therefore, we estimate HLMs with random-intercepts only and 
HLMs with random intercepts and random slopes; and test whether the latter are nested within the former.  
4. Multivariate Meta-Regression Model (MRM) 
To address the issues of heterogeneity, we estimate a multivariate hierarchical meta-regression model 
specified in (A7) below.  
𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑗𝑟𝑖
) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
(𝑍𝑘𝑖)
𝑆𝐸𝑗𝑟𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
(A7) 
Here, 𝑡𝑗𝑖 is the 𝑖th 𝑡-value from the 𝑗th study, while 𝑍𝑘𝑖 is a 𝑘 × 1 vector of moderator variables that capture 
the observable sources of heterogeneity in the government size-growth evidence base.  
To minimise the risk of multicollinearity and over-fitting, we estimate (A7) through a general-to-specific 
estimation routine, whereby we omit the most insignificant variables (variables associated with the largest p-
values) one at a time until all remaining covariates are statistically significant. We present the findings from 
the specific and general models side by side to: (a) establish the extent of congruence between the significant 
moderating factors; and (ii) identify the range of moderating variables that do not affect the variation in the 
evidence base. 
